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Commentary
Bennett T. McCallum and Edward Nelson
against targeting rules” is to suggest something
that we could not imagine that Lars would
believe, especially because we use targeting rules
in our own work—e.g., McCallum and Nelson
(2004) and Jensen and McCallum (2002).
On his p. 613, Svensson emphasizes that
“there is now a rapidly growing literature by
many authors that successfully applies targeting
rules to monetary policy analysis” and hints that
historical inevitability is on his side (page 613,
paragraph 2). We agree that an increasing fraction
of monetary policy rule analysis is based on tar-
geting rules, but this fact does not settle any of
the actual issues. In Svensson’s passages, for
example, there is a good bit of appealing rhetoric
but no indication of how a study is judged to be
“successful.” Besides, there are many types of
contemporary phenomena that seem inevitable
yet highly undesirable.
In his footnote 3, Svensson says that we “seem
to believe that no central bank is using a targeting
rule and that a central bank needs to announce
an explicit loss function to use a targeting rule,”
which he denies. But in this regard, it is impor-
tant to note that our paper interprets a targeting
rule as definitionally given by optimality condi-
tions with respect to a particular objective func-
tion and particular model. Our justification for
this stated limitation is based on Svensson’s
W
e are very pleased that Lars
Svensson refers to us as “good
friends,” for we certainly view
him in that manner. We therefore
regret that we have little agreement with the
manner in which he has represented the argu-
ments in our paper (McCallum and Nelson, 2005).
To begin with, to characterize our paper as
“destructive” is, we believe, not justified by the
content of the paper. One of its main purposes
is to recognize and emphasize that there is no
single approach to policy rule analysis that is
uniquely legitimate; targeting rules are appropri-
ate and convenient for some problems, whereas
instrument rules are for others. That this is our
position should be clear from our previous writ-
ings, from the explicit passage on our page 598,1
and from the fact that over half of our paper—
Sections 5 and 6—is devoted to analysis show-
ing that instrument rules can be used to approx-
imate targeting rules as closely as desired. In
what sense is any of this “destructive,” rather
than merely expressing a somewhat different,
more eclectic, approach to policy rule analysis?
Also, to suggest that we are engaged in a “struggle
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1 “It is not our intention to argue that analysis with instrument rules
is in all respects preferable to the use of targeting rules. Even if we
held that belief, moreover, we would not think it socially desirable
for all researchers to employ the same approach.”
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         practice as well as his several writings on the
subject prior to his Journal of Economic Literature
paper (2003a). It is adopted explicitly in our
paper—see footnote 6.
INVALID ANALOGY WITH 
CONSUMPTION THEORY
In his Section 2, Svensson makes the observa-
tion, with which we agree fully, that it is desirable
to model consumption decisions—and, for that
matter, all other private sector spending and pric-
ing decisions—as reflecting optimizing behavior
by private agents in the economy. But Svensson’s
conclusions about the implications of this obser-
vation for modeling central bank behavior consti-
tute a non sequitur. Dynamic general equilibrium
theory implies that valid policy analysis—for
example, working out the implications for infla-
tion or output gap variability of a particular
monetary policy rule—always requires modeling
the private sector as optimizing. By contrast, how
central bank behavior should be modeled depends
on the purpose of the analysis. If the intention is
to work out the effects of a constant money growth
rule, then the central bank should be modeled as
following a constant money growth rule. If the
intention is to work out the effects of a fixed
exchange rate regime, the central bank should be
modeled as pursuing a fixed exchange rate. And
if the intention is to work out the effects of the
regimes that we observe in practice, the analyst
should strive to model central bank behavior
realistically.
Svensson, of course, argues that the most
realistic characterization of inflation targeting is
as a targeting rule. We have presented evidence
that casts doubt on this characterization and have
argued that an instrument rule characterization
of actual central bank behavior is preferable. To
emphasize, we argued that this was a valid charac-
terization of the manner in which some inflation-
targeting central banks actually carried out their
policy decisions. We rested our argument not on
the “descriptive” grounds Svensson attributes to
us—i.e., on the ex post reduced-form relationships
between the monetary policy instrument and
other variables—but on documentation produced
by these inflation-targeting central banks of their
practices and on the support that that evidence
provides for an instrument rule interpretation of
policy.2 If our claim is valid, then the appropriate
means of carrying out a structural analysis of infla-
tion targeting is to use a model that combines the
private sector’s optimality conditions with an
instrument rule (possibly including expectational
terms) estimated over the period of inflation target-
ing. There is no internal inconsistency, or irony,
in following this procedure. Rather, the procedure
takes into account the necessary condition for a
valid structural model (i.e., private sector optimiz-
ing behavior), while also using the policy rule
specification that is the best approximation of
actual practice.
FRIEDMAN’S k-PERCENT RULE
In his latest discussion, Svensson goes beyond
his argument that targeting rules closely describe
the practice of inflation-targeting central banks,
to claim that even “Friedman’s k-percent rule is
a targeting rule!” (2005, p. 614). A more careful
consideration of Friedman’s own description of
his proposed rule, however, rules out a targeting
rule interpretation.
Svensson argues that, because Friedman’s
proposal involves targeting growth in a definition
of the money supply that includes commercial
bank deposits, the targeted variable is necessarily
out of direct control of the central bank. Therefore,
he contends, the effort of the central bank to target
a monetary aggregate can be characterized as a
targeting rule. But the specifics of Friedman’s
proposal clearly contradict targeting rule practice.
Consider first the specific proposal for the k-
percent money growth rule outlined in Friedman
McCallum and Nelson
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2 This documentation included evidence that inflation-targeting
countries viewed discretionary adjustments to policy as adjust-
ments to the settings implied by an instrument rule. The implica-
tion of this for our discussion of Svensson is that, contrary to the
suggestions of Svensson (2003a), central banks’ use of “judgment”
is not evidence in favor of targeting rules over instrument rules as
a characterization of inflation targeting. Svensson’s (2005) footnote 8
muddies the waters by focusing on the discretion-vs.-commitment
issue rather than the targeting-vs.-instrument rules issue that is at
the heart of our debate. (1960). The 1960 proposal included a list of
reforms to be undertaken prior to implementing
the rule, including the introduction of 100 percent
reserve requirements on those commercial banks
whose deposits were included in the proposed
target aggregate. This reform would make the
target identical to the monetary base—immediately
making the k-percent rule an instrument rule.
More frequently, Friedman has set out a k-
percent money growth proposal without suggest-
ing the major overhaul of the financial system
implied by a 100 percent reserve requirement. In
that case, the definition of money targeted, if it
includes commercial bank deposits, will not be
subject to exact central bank control. Does this
rule proposal correspond to a targeting rule?
Clearly not. Consider the following specifics of
the proposal as given by Friedman (1982, p.117):
Set a target for several years ahead for a single
aggregate—for example, M2 or the base…
Estimate the change over an extended
period, say three to six months, in the Fed’s
holdings of securities that would be necessary
to approximate the target path over that period.
Divide that estimate by 13 or 26. Let the Fed
purchase precisely that amount every week…
Finally, announce in advance and in full
detail the proposed schedule of purchases and
stick to it.
Friedman’s proposal here refers to targeting
either “M2 or the base.” The latter again corre-
sponds simply to a constant-growth instrument
rule for the base. In the case of M2 targeting,
denoting the log of the money multiplier by 
mu = log (M2) – h, with h the log of the monetary
base, this rule is given by ∆ht = (k/400) – 1.0
Et–1∆mut, that is, a simple instrument rule with
an intercept term and one further argument, the
expected change in the money multiplier.3 Impor-
tantly, Friedman’s proposal explicitly specifies
the policy instrument (the monetary base) with
which to pursue the target. A targeting rule, by
contrast, generally does not explicitly refer to the
policy instrument.
While we disagree with Svensson’s character-
ization of Friedman’s rule, his surrounding discus-
sion does indicate that his perspective is coming
closer to ours. Whereas Svensson once devoted
considerable effort to arguing that “[i]nflation-
targeting central banks should specify explicit
loss functions…[including] a specific relative
weight on output-gap stabilization” (Svensson,
2003b, p. 148), Svensson (2005) goes so far as to
say that a “simple and robust monetary policy
rule is indeed an attractive idea,” especially if
the central bank “does not trust its information
about…the output gap” and in light of uncertainty
about “the true model of the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy.” These are, of course,
long-standing arguments of those who argue for
instrument rules. A targeting rule is hardly an
ideal way of treating these problems. The lack of
information about the output gap that Svensson
acknowledges would make it hard for central
bank committee members to settle on a way of
estimating the gap, let alone follow the Svensson
(2003b) proposal of announcing a welfare function
with an explicit output gap weight. Proceeding
with such an announcement in the face of uncer-
tainty about the output gap would hardly be the
way to create a “robust” rule and so would be
unattractive by Svensson’s own standard. As we
emphasized in McCallum and Nelson (2005), the
more general dilemma for targeting rules is that
they are especially vulnerable to robustness prob-
lems because of their model dependency. Levin
and Williams’s (2003) results graphically depict
the bloodbath that can result from imposing target-
ing rules derived from one model specification
on models that come from other areas of the
specification space. 
VOLATILITY ANALYSIS
Let us now consider Svensson’s discussion
of our analytical contribution concerning interest
rate variability. We are, of course, quite pleased
that he acknowledges that our claims regarding
volatility are correct, under the information
McCallum and Nelson
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3 Note that Friedman (1982) explicitly disavows using period-t
information in pursuing the monetary target. His proposal there-
fore cannot correspond to a targeting rule because an optimal-
control approach to targeting M2 would utilize period-t information
helpful in hitting the target. Friedman is clearly willing to forfeit
possible extra precision in hitting the target in favor of making the
target one that can be pursued by a fully predictable instrument
rule for the monetary base.assumptions utilized in Svensson (2003a) and
Svensson and Woodford (2005). We had been
under the impression that these assumptions
reflected careful consideration, as is typically the
case in the work of both Svensson and Woodford.
But now Lars goes on to propose new assumptions
as representing “realistic” information conditions.
We find the particulars of his specification to be
unclear—e.g., concerning “early” versus “late”
in a given time period and especially the notion
that the central bank would “observe” its own
error; so, rather than attempting a new discussion,
let us state our position regarding information
assumptions that we believe to be appropriate
for monetary policy analysis. In previous work
(e.g., McCallum and Nelson, 2004), we have sug-
gested that, when setting it (the one-period instru-
ment interest rate in period t), the central bank
does not know the values of πt or xt (the inflation
rate and output gap, respectively, during period
t). Let us now provisionally agree with Svensson
that private agents also do not know πt or xt when
making decisions in period t. But they do know
it, for financial market prices are observable day
by day (or hour by hour), so it rather than Et–1it
appears in equation (7). Then, under the assump-
tion of rational expectations and with common
information sets—except that private agents do
not know et–1, the central bank error made in set-
ting it—private agents will be able to infer et–1
from the central bank’s policy rule together with
the specification of the economy using equation
(12) or (15). Therefore, expectations formed in
period t of any variable for period t or the future
will be the same for the central bank and private
agents. The foregoing is, however, equivalent to
the assumption used in our paper (as well as in
Svensson, 2003a, and Svensson and Woodford,
2005). So the analysis as presented in our Section 6
seems to be realistically appropriate, as well as
consistent with the two just-cited papers.
In the section of his comment that discusses
volatility, Svensson also presents five claims
(“first,” “second,” etc.) that are logically irrelevant
to the discussion—of course his equation (9) is
an approximation to (8)!—except for the fourth
item. This one is basically incorrect, however,
because to implement Svensson’s (8) requires
use of his (5); the function of (9) in this context
is to constitute one way of implementing (8).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we note that on p. 621
Svensson warns as follows: “Central bankers,
beware of McCallum and Nelson’s instrument
rule!” But the rule he is referring to—with a very
large value of µ1—is one that we say (explicitly)
that we have not recommended (please see our
discussion on p. 603). It was used in our 2004
paper as an implementation device; in our current
paper, it serves to illustrate our analytical claim,
namely, that our instrument rule (actually, class
of rules) is usually superior in performance, with
respect to Lars’s own criterion, to the targeting
rule that it approximates.
Finally we turn to Svensson’s featured ques-
tion: “What is wrong with McCallum and Nelson?”
In terms of personal characteristics, we would
admit to a multitude of flaws, weaknesses, and
fundamental defects. In terms of the arguments
of our paper, however, we believe that the correct
answer is: “Nothing.”
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